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       I present evidence on recent bankruptcy resolution and bankruptcy reform in Japan. Prior to 
bankruptcy, bank lenders are less likely to intervene than they did before. Most bankrupt firms experience 
abnormal president turnover around bankruptcy filings, regardless types of filings. Priority of claims is 
less violated in bankruptcy resolution in Japan than in the United States. A Civil Rehabilitation firm 
spends in bankruptcy substantially shorter than a Corporate Reorganization firm. Also, a Corporate 
Reorganization firms emerges quicker after the 2000 bankruptcy reform. The main difference between 
Rehabilitation duration and Reorganization duration is that leverage prolongs Civil Rehabilitation 
duration only.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
     Bankruptcy is integral as a screening process designed to eliminate inefficient 
firms. Through the legal mechanism of bankruptcy, most inefficient firms are eliminated 
in US (White 1990). As an alternative to bankruptcy liquidation, bankruptcy 
reorganization provides a legal procedure in circumstances when a failing firm’s 
recourses are most valuable if they continue operating. However, firms typically file for 
bankruptcy reorganization voluntarily as well as for bankruptcy liquidation. Because 
managers do not take creditors’ loss into account in deciding whether and when to file 
for bankruptcy, typically firm file for bankruptcy too late than soon. Thus, a bankruptcy 
system, rather than helping the economy to eliminate inefficient firms, may delay the 
movement of resources to the best uses (White 1990). 
    Also,  bankruptcy  reorganization  is  costly. Bankruptcy costs are direct and indirect. 
Direct costs encompass are charges of legal and other professional services. Indirect 
costs include a wide range of opportunity costs, such as lost investment opportunities 
and lost sales. It is widely believed that indirect costs are significantly higher for 
bankruptcy than private renegotiation (Gilson et al. 1990). Private renegotiation is an 
alternative to bankruptcy reorganization. The alternatives are similar to obtain relief 
from default when creditors consent to rewrite their debt contracts. Firms and creditors’ 
incentives to settle out of court and the renegotiation results reflect the legal and 
institutional costs of bankruptcy process. 
So far, it has been viewed as a striking aspect of Japanese main bank system: it 
provides a flexible, more effective private alternative to bankruptcy reorganization, for 
dealing with financial distress and debt restructurings. Till the early the 1990s, 
bankruptcy resolution is rarely employed for large Japanese firms. Most financially   3
distressed large firms in Japan successfully restructure troubled debt privately with main 
bank intervention, rather than through formal bankruptcy. Three main reasons are 
considered regarding the main bank system. First, banks represent interests of various 
classes of claimholders, usually holding both equities and loans. Second, both debt and 
equities of Japanese firms are concentrated with a small number of banks, and usually 
banks hold largest blocks of Japanese firms. Third, Japanese firms traditionally heavily 
rely on bank loans (Sheard 1994).   
As the 1990s’ recession of in Japan persisting, however, recently quite a few 
publicly traded Japanese firms file for bankruptcy. This study investigates the 
intervention of bank lenders prior to bankruptcy filings, president turnover around 
bankruptcy, the indirect costs of bankruptcy such as priority violation in bankruptcy 
resolution as well as duration in bankruptcy, by focusing on the differences under 
Corporate Reorganization Law: a trustee control procedure vs. Civil Rehabilitation 
Law: a debtor in possession bankruptcy procedure, which takes effect after April 2000.   
Out of 52 firms, active bank interventions, such as financial rescue operations and 
dispatch of managers are observed only for ten firms. Regardless of bank lenders’ 
rescue operations, the ten firms failed to restructure debt privately and finally ended in 
bankruptcies. At the same time, the remaining 42 financially distressed firms straightly 
filed for bankruptcy, while bank lenders rejecting any financial rescues up until 
bankruptcy filing. This finding demonstrates a big change in Japanese corporate 
governance: Japanese bank lenders are less likely to rescue their troubled borrowing 
firms than they did before. This is probably because quite a few of previous debt 
restructurings initiated by main banks in the mid 1990s finally ended up in bankruptcies. 
Another reason is that the DIP (debtor-in-possession) Civil Rehabilitation procedure is 
not so burdensome for the debtor’ managers as the Corporate Reorganization procedure   4
which is controlled court-appointed receiver.   
      Either with or without bank lender intervention, most firms experience president 
turnover and asset restructurings prior to bankruptcy filings. In a reorganization 
bankruptcy, a court appointed receiver operates the firm and works out a reorganization 
plan and in principle the incumbent management departs. By comparison, in a Civil 
Rehabilitation bankruptcy, it is possible for the incumbent debtor’s management to 
remain to operate the firm and to work out a rehabilitation plan. Out of 27 
Rehabilitation firms, thirteen presidents remain after Civil Rehabilitation proceedings 
commence. Among the thirteen presidents, however, nine of them seem less likely to be 
responsible for the management failures: they are either newly appointed or appointed 
by large shareholders, bank lenders. 
For violation of priority of claims, priority of claims in 39 cases held among a 
sample of 46 publicly traded firms that filed for Corporate Reorganization Law or Civil 
Rehabilitation Law between January 1997 and August 2002, comparing with 29 cases of 
priority violation among the 37 American firms in a previous study. Priorities for 
secured violation are rarely violated in Japan as well as in U.S. In contrast, priority 
violation for unsecured creditors is more likely to occur in U.S. 
The average time from filing of the bankruptcy petition under Corporate 
Reorganization Law to resolution of a sample of 24 firms is 2.2 years, and on average it 
takes 0.57 years for 27 firms to reach resolution from Civil Rehabilitation petition filing, 
1.6 years less than that of Corporate Reorganization Law. Bankrupt firms emerge 
substantially faster after the 2000 bankruptcy The average time from bankruptcy 
petition to resolution in Japan is 1.2 years, about 1.3 years shorter than the average time 
of a sample 37 New York and American Stock Exchange firms filing for bankruptcy in a 
large downturn of American economy between November 1979 and December 1986,   5
which is reported in previous studies on American bankruptcy resolution. Hence, 
internationally Japan also has a quite effective bankruptcy legal system.   
The analysis on the duration in bankruptcy shows that leverage has no 
significant effect on duration in Corporate Reorganization. In comparison, high 
leveraged Civil Rehabilitation firms are less likely to quickly emerge from the process. 
This suggests that before the bankruptcy legal reform in 2000 financially distressed 
firms seem have no incentives to file for Corporate Reorganization earlier, because they 
would lose anything regardless of the speed of the bankruptcy legal process. If more and 
more managers of firms in economic difficulties realize that it is more likely to quickly 
emerge from Civil Rehabilitation to file for Rehabilitation soon, Civil Rehabilitation 
Law may provide an incentive for firms in economic difficulties to file for Civil 
Rehabilitation not too late in the future. Another difference is that bondholder holdouts 
delay the Corporate Reorganization process while it is not the case for Rehabilitation. 
But bondholder holdout problem is minor because only a very small fraction of 
bankrupt firms have public bonds outstanding, different from the case of junk bond in 
Helwege  (1999).   
Interestingly, asset size is not significant in any estimates for duration in either 
Corporate Reorganization or Civil Rehabilitation. In contrast, Helwege (1999), Li 
(1999), Orbe et al (2001), Dahiya et al (2003) all show that larger firms tend to stay 
longer in Chapter 11 in US. This study provides important evidence for international 
comparative law study. One explanation is that virtually shareholders are not entitled the 
right of vote in case where the company fails to fully satisfy its debt obligations with its 
properties both under Corporate Reorganization Law and Civil Rehabilitation Law. 
Therefore, the Japanese bankruptcy legal procedure is simpler than the U.S. procedure.   
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides descriptions on bankruptcy   6
procedures in Japan, in particular, procedures of Civil Rehabilitation Law, which takes 
effect on April 2000 in response to increasing bankruptcies, as well as data descriptions 
on bankruptcy filings. In Section 3, I investigate bank lenders’ intervention prior to 
bankruptcy. Section 4 tracks top management turnover around bankruptcy. Section 5 
presents bankruptcy resolution and examines priority violation. In Section 6, I analyze 
the duration in bankruptcy. Section 7 concludes.     
 
2.   Increasing Bankruptcies and the Insolvency Legal System Reform 
in Japan 
 
   First, let’s see the time series of bankruptcy filings for publicly traded Japanese 
firms in years January 1987-August 2002. A bankrupt firm is identified by the reference 
to a bankruptcy filing under Corporate Reorganization Law, or Liquidation Law, or 
Civil Rehabilitation Law of Nikkei Shinbun, the Fact book of Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Banks, housing loan companies, insurance companies and security companies are 
excluded, because they are deeply intervened by the government. As Table 1 shows, 
most of bankruptcy filings are clustered in the years 1997–2002. Eighty-seven percent 
of bankruptcies are filed in the years 1997-2002. This is consistent with the timing of 
the general recession of the 1990s, which is still persisting.   
 
Insert <Table 1 >here 
 
    In response to skyrocketing increase of bankruptcy filings, Japan is reforming its 
bankruptcy legal system. Before April 1 2000, mainly two types of bankruptcy filings   7
are available to large corporations in Japan: Corporate Reorganization Law
1 and 
Liquidation Law. Liquidation Law, equivalent to Chapter 7 of the U.S. bankruptcy Code 
(henceforth the Code), provides for the orderly liquidation of a firm’s assets by a 
court-appointed trustee. Corporate Reorganization Law is roughly equivalent to Chapter 
11 of the Code, and it provides for reorganization of a bankrupt firm, which is expected 
to continue as a going concern. For instance, Corporate Reorganization Law imposes 
stay that prevents creditors from colleting on their debt, or, foreclosing on their 
collateral, from the date of the ruling to the date of approval of the reorganization plan, 
or, to the termination of the proceeding, or, for the period of a year from the date of the 
ruling. Even before the ruling of commencement, the court may order stay, if it is in 
need. 
And, a reorganization plan should be approved by each class of claimholders: 
two-thirds or more of the total amount of the votes of reorganization creditors, 
three-fourths or more of the total amount of the votes of reorganization secured 
creditors, and the majority of shareholders. With regard to a draft which provides for the 
reduction or exemption of reorganization security rights, or contains other provisions 
affecting the security rights, the consent shall be obtained from those who possess the 
right to vote corresponding to four-fifths or more of reorganization secured creditors. 
Moreover, the consent should be obtained form all reorganization secured creditors, 
with regard to a draft which contents are liquidation when it is clear that it is difficult to 
prepare a draft plan of reorganization which contents are to continue the business as a 
                                                       
1 Composition Law also provided for reorganization without a court-appointed 
receiver. In practice, however, Composition Law filings are extremely rare for large 
companies. Hereafter, I focus on rather Reorganization Law and Liquidation Law in 
Japan than Composition Law.   8
going concern or through amalgamation, formation of a new company, or transfer of 
business. Obviously, secured creditors are entitled strong powers under Corporate 
Reorganization Law. On the other hand, shareholder shall not have the right of vote; in 
the case the company cannot fully satisfy its obligations with its prosperities.   
Also the court may confirm a reorganization plan, even if the draft plan of 
reorganization is voted on, but there are groups fail to consent, or it is evident that it is 
impossible to obtain the consent from persons whose voting rights exceeding the 
amount as prescribed by laws, through modifying the plan and stipulating the terms 
which protect the rights of dissenting persons fairly and equitably. Similar to 
“cram-down” under US Chapter 11 discussed in White (1990), the “fair and equitable” 
standard closely is reflective of absolute priority rule in liquidation. If the contents of 
the plan are to continue the business as a going concern or through amalgamation, 
formation of a new company, to transfer to the new company, to assign to the others, or 
to preserve in the company, the properties forming pre-bankruptcy lien rights, it requires 
that the secured creditors retain their pre-bankruptcy lien rights on the assets and thus 
get payments equal to the value of their claims. If the firm is sold piecemeal, the 
proceeds of sale of properties to be appropriated to payment to claims with respect to 
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, shareholders are paid according to priority of 
claims. Also the trustee may pay a fair price equal to the claims of a dissenting group 
according priority. If no plan is submitted or adopted, the confirmed plan is insolvent, 
the court may rule for the discontinuance of reorganization proceedings. In that case, the 
court may order a shift of the firm’s bankruptcy filing to Liquidation
2.  
A big difference between Japanese Reorganization practice and the practice of US 
                                                       
2  Also a shift to Civil Rehabilitation is possible after April 2000.     9
Chapter 11 is that, not the debtor’s management, but a court-appointed receiver operates 
the firm and works out a reorganization plan
3. And in principle incumbent managers 
depart the firm, once Corporate Reorganization proceeding commences. In other words, 
incumbent managers experience large personal costs under Corporate Reorganization 
Law. This aspect is rather similar to Chapter 7 of the Code as well as Liquidation Law 
of Japan. Since managers are displaced and in almost all cases equity becomes 
worthless, managers have strong incentives to resist Liquidation or Reorganization as 
long as possible. This means both Liquidation and Reorganization can be inefficient 
procedures in terms of ex ante bankruptcy costs in White (1983).   
As a response to this issue, Civil Rehabilitation Law is passed and it takes effect 
after April 1 2000
4. The passage of Civil Rehabilitation Law has been substantially 
revising bankruptcy administration in Japan. One aspect is equivalent to Chapter 11 of 
the Code as following: the debtor’ management operates the firm and works out a 
Rehabilitation plan or liquidation, unless an interested party can prove management is 
incompetent. In a case where the debtor’s management is incompetent, Civil 
Rehabilitation Law provides the appointment of trustee. This debtor in possession 
aspect of Civil Rehabilitation Law aims to provide incentives for managers of failing 
firms to file for bankruptcy under Rehabilitation Law by reducing their personal 
                                                       
3 Under Corporate Reorganization Law, it is possible that a director or an executive of 
bankrupt firms to be appointed as a receiver. In practice, however, in most cases only 
lawyers are appointed. The amended Corporate Reorganization Law explicitly states the 
condition for a debtor’s director or executive to be capable as receiver. 
4 At the same time, Composition Law was abolished. Small and middle firms 
sometimes used it. A firm was able to file for Composition only if the firm failed to 
meet its debt payment obligations. Typically, a firm is viewed to be unable to meet it 
debt payment obligations if banks dishonor its bills. This condition is equivalent to 
causes of Liquidation filings. Also, a composition filing should be prepackaged, in other 
words, the firm had to submit a Composition plan immediately as soon as the firm filing 
for Composition. Most severely, the court was not authorized to order stay even if it is 
in need. For the above reasons, Composition filings were extremely rare for large firms.   10
burdens.  
The passage of a rehabilitation draft plan requires affirmative votes by only 
rehabilitation creditors who are entitled to vote and have attended the assembly and who 
constitute the majority of attending persons entitled to vote, and at the same hold one 
half or more of the total amount of the votes of the persons who entitled to vote. 
Generally, secured creditors may exercise their rights outside the rehabilitation 
proceedings. And also the court may give an approval for a person to file a rehabilitation 
plan that includes terms for reduction of capital, in case where a rehabilitation debtor 
company fails to fully meet its payment obligations with its properties. Compared with 
the passage of a reorganization draft plan, the approval seems simple. Different from 
Chapter 11 of the Code, Civil Rehabilitation Law does not impose automatic stay to 
protect the firm from creditors’ harassment. Based on application of an interested party, 
however, the court may, in case where an application for commencement of 
rehabilitation has been filed, order a discontinuance of exercise of a security right 
existing on properties of rehabilitation debtor. Moreover, the rehabilitation debtor, may, 
in a case where collateral properties are indispensable for continuation of business of 
the debtor, make an application to the court for an approval of extinguishing all the 
security right on the properties, by paying money equivalent to the market value of the 
properties to the court. Main differences between Corporate Reorganization Law and 
Civil Rehabilitation Law are summarized at Table 2. 
 
Insert <Table 2> here 
 
As shown above, to continue as a going concern, a large Japanese firm can mainly 
file for bankruptcy under Corporate Reorganization Law before April 2000. As Civil   11
Rehabilitation Law takes effect on April 1 2000, a bankrupt firm can file for either 
Reorganization or Rehabilitation. In practice, corporate debtors seem to prefer civil 
rehabilitation filings to corporate reorganization filings, as suggested by a rush of civil 
rehabilitation filings soon after Civil Rehabilitation Law comes into force on April 1 
2000. Table 1 shows civil rehabilitation filings increase sharply from 2000. Probably 
expecting that they can remain, incumbent managers of bankrupt firms are in favor to 
file bankruptcy under Civil Rehabilitation Law rather than Corporate Reorganization 
Law, or Liquidation Law. Indeed, there are four Corporate Reorganization filings but no 
Bankruptcy filings, comparing with nineteen firms filing for bankruptcy under Civil 
Rehabilitation Law, from April 2000 till September 2001.   
A problem is arising from the passage and practice of Civil Rehabilitation Law. 
What is the priority of the two procedures, if two different interest parties file for 
Reorganization, Rehabilitation respectively? Including Liquidation procedure, 
Reorganization has the highest priority. When two interest parties are filing for 
Rehabilitation and Reorganization respectively; the court may order the suspension of 
Rehabilitation procedure upon the application the interest party filing Reorganization
5. 
Virtually, the incumbent management has to convert to Reorganization from 
Rehabilitation when large creditors are against the Rehabilitation filing. The most well 
known case is Mycal’s conversion into Corporate Reorganization. Mycal, a default 
supermarket chain once dismissed its president, whose appointment was initiated by the 
main bank, and attempted to file for bankruptcy under Civil Rehabilitation Law, while 
its largest bank lender opposing. Mycal finally ended up in Corporate Reorganization 
filing. After Mycal’s conversion into Corporate Reorganization, Corporate 
                                                       
5  Liquidation has the lowest priority. The court may order suspension of Liquidation 
procedure upon the application of interest parties.   12
Reorganization filings increase again and a few of firms file for bankruptcy under 
Liquidation Law, probably because creditors oppose Civil  Rehabilitation filings 
initiated by debtors’ managers, who attempt to avoid taking responsibility for 
bankruptcies.  
  In this study, I focus on cases, where bankrupt firms are expected to continue as 
going concerns, in the years 1997-2002, when formal bankruptcy turns out to be 
common. This study is consist of a sample of 52 publicly traded firms that filed for 
bankruptcy under Corporate Reorganization Law, Civil Rehabilitation Law in the years 
1997-2002, after deleting 3 Civil Rehabilitation firms which data is not available. I 
investigate following issues as: Are Japanese bank lenders still trying to rescue their 
troubled borrowing firms as they did before? What is going on for the incumbent 
management of bankrupt firms? What is the bankruptcy resolution like in Japan? How 
does the passage of Civil Rehabilitation Law affect bankruptcy resolution? And how 
long does it take for Reorganization firms, Rehabilitation firms to work out resolution? 
 
3.  Bank  Lenders’  Pre-bankruptcy  Intervention  
 
In this section, I examine bank lenders’ interventions around bankruptcy filings, by 
the reference to new president appointments, dispatch of directors and officers from 
bank, and bank lenders’ rescue operations. A rescue operation is defined as one of the 
following consequences (i) required interest or principal payments on loans are reduced; 
(ii) the maturities of loans are extended; or (iii) loans are swapped with equities. 
Information and relevant data are obtained from Nikkei and company annual report. .     
Prior to bankruptcy filings, eight firms attempt to restructure their debt, rescued by 
the bank lenders. They account for only 15% of the 52 firms. This result suggests that   13
main banks’ rescue operations are not as popular as it was observed up till the early 
1990s. Once, a public traded firm occasionally filed for bankruptcy under Corporate 
Reorganization Law, but it usually followed “a period of close involvement by the main 
bank in its restructuring effort” and was “triggered by the main bank’s decision to 
curtail its activist role and risking financial exposure”, as noted in Shard (1994). Even 
taking the fact that bank lenders appoint chairman, vice presidents, managing directors 
and directors into account, at least 42 firms straightly file for bankruptcy, without 
following a period of close involvement of the main bank in this study. Our study 
provides an important piece of evidence: Japanese banks jettison a large proportion of 
troubled borrowers even for large firms. 
 
Insert <Table 3> here 
 
Why do Japanese banks to jettison their corporate borrowers, once they used to 
readily rescue their troubled borrowers? It is helpful to first review the main futures of 
the main bank system. Sheard (1994) argues that three main reasons are considered 
regarding the main bank system. First, banks represent interests of various classes of 
claimholders, usually holding both equities and loans. Second, both debt and equities of 
Japanese firms are concentrated with a small number of banks, and usually banks hold 
largest blocks of Japanese firms. Third, Japanese firms traditionally heavily rely on 
bank loans.   
In comparing the U.S. and Japanese legal regimes, however, Ramseyer (1995) 
suggests the following hypotheses, even through he asserts that we know only that both 
Japanese and U.S. banks rescuer a few large troubled firms and jettison most. First, 
Japanese firms heavily rely on bank loans than U.S. firms, in part because regulatory   14
restrictions on bond issuance. Second, traditionally U.S. judges have looked skeptically 
at creditors who intervene in a debtor’s business and sometimes U.S. judges subordinate 
its claims, if a bank intervenes. It is called the doctrine of equitable subordination”. So, 
U.S. banks less often rescue their borrowers, perhaps, because rescues are often 
unprofitable. Under lender liability law in the U.S., creditors who intervene debtor’s 
affairs can be sued to pay various debtor liabilities. Nevertheless, U.S. banks sometimes 
place their representatives on the board of firms in financial distress directly and gain 
additional control over firms’ investment and financing policies, as reported in Gilson 
(1990).  
Recently, Xu (2003b) reports that there are 29 cases of private debt restructurings 
and 63 cases of bankruptcy filings. The above results suggest that, not only in Japan but 
also in the U.S., restructuring debt privately led by bank lenders, is an important 
alternative to formal bankruptcy. These results demonstrate a big change in Japan-US 
comparative corporate governance: similarities dominate differences in comparing the 
US bankruptcy wave in the 1980s and this bankruptcy wave in Japan. So far, earlier 
studies have found many differences in comparing a downturn of US economy and an 
upturn of Japanese economy in the 1980s.   
What causes this convergence in US-Japan comparative corporate governance? I 
suggest four reasons for this substantial change of the corporate governance of financial 
distress in Japan. First, the passage of Civil Rehabilitation Law reduces personal costs 
of debtors’ management, suggested by the rush of rehabilitation filings. Virtually, some 
presidents of failing firms are allowed to continue to operate the firms after 
rehabilitation as shown in the next section. Another reason is the deregulation in the 
domestic corporate bond market. Since the late 1980s, Japanese firms are allowed to 
issue public corporate bonds instead of bank borrowings. It is more difficult for banks   15
make concessions when there are public bonds outstanding, as suggested in James 
(1995, 1996). It can only be a minor reason, however. A very small fraction of bankrupt 
firms have public bonds outstanding. Next reason for Japanese banks to hesitate to 
rescue their troubled borrowing firms is that low likelihood of successful rescue 
operations in the early 1990s. This is consistent with empirical findings of Hirota and 
Miyajima (2001)
6, Shikano (1995). Finally, probably the health of Japanese banks 
largely affects banks’ rescue decisions as well. However, the failure of rescue operations 
has substantially hurt the health of the banks and thus the causality between banks’ 
health and rescue decisions is complicated. 
Because has been compared with that of a downturn in the U.S. economy corporate 
governance of an upturn in Japanese economy, the extent of roles of main banks in 
financial distress is exaggerated. It is worth to point out that private debt restructure 
initiated by banks is alternative to formal bankruptcy, while formal bankruptcy is 
increasing its importance in this downturn of Japanese economy. The two systems are 
complementary but not substitute, not only in US but also in Japan when the economy is 
confronted with a bankruptcy wave. I believe my study complements to comparison 
studies on Japan and U.S. corporate governance in the 1980s. Further research on what 
is driving such convergence is needed in comparative corporate governance study.   
                                                       
6 Hirota and Miyajima (2001) find that Japanese banks are less likely to intervene in 
financial distress in the 1990s than they did after the oil shocks in the 1970s, and that 
even bank lenders are involved; the timing of top management turnover and the 
recovery of profit are slower in the 1990s than in the 1970s. Shikano (1995) points out 
that the successes of rescue operations are mainly due to the industrial recovery rather 
than the improvement of relative performance of rescued firms in the 1980s. In the late 
1990s, many Japanese firms are being forced to exit confronted with the competitive 
pressure from Chinese economy, as a large number of U.S. firms were confronted with 
the strong competitive pressure from Japanese economy. Consequently, the delay of 
industrial recoveries diminishes the likelihood of successful bank interventions in the 
late 1990s.   16
 
4.  Management  Turnover 
 
As a first frequently employed debtor-in possession bankruptcy procedure, it is 
emerging an important theme how the incumbent management is treated around 
Rehabilitation. Because all incumbent managers depart once a receiver in reorganization 
is appointed by the court, I first look into president management turnover prior to 
Corporate Reorganization filings, when I compare management turnover in 
Reorganization and that in Rehabilitation. Starting four years before the year of 
Corporate Reorganization filing, I tract president changes. As reported in Kaplan (1992), 
in normal top management succession, a retired president remains as Chairman with 
representative directorship. Except normal management succession, death or illness, 
Table 4 shows that fifty-seven percent of firms experience president changes, form date 
–4 to the date of Corporate Reorganization filing, measure in years. In two firm-years 
former directors of bank lender were appointed, and in one case a former director of the 
top shareholder was appointed, respectively. After turnover, most former presidents 
remain honorary positions such as chairmen but without representative directorship, 
advisory directors, part-time directors, directors without other titles, or consultants in 
original companies. Two of replaced presidents were removed down to vice presidents. 
No intended positions/occupations are available for the remaining four replaced 
presidents, who probably departed the original companies.   
 
Insert <Table 4> here 
 
In the same way, I tract the president changes for Rehabilitation firms. Panel B in   17
Table 4 documents 29 abnormal president changes experienced by 27 firms around Civil 
Rehabilitation filing. Excluding 2 bankrupt firms caused by fraud of management, firms 
experienced abnormal president turnover account for 86% of all firms. Probably being 
forced to depart, half of presidents after replacement hold no specified positions or 
occupations. Including one president, who intended to resign, the number of firms, 
about 90% of all firms experienced president change once around Rehabilitation filings. 
I also keep tract of presidents who remain after rehabilitations commence. Out of 13 
cases, 4 presidents’ appointments are initiated by bank lenders; large shareholders prior 
rehabilitation; and therefore it seems less problematic for them to continue to control the 
firms. Another 5 insider presidents have careers as president less than 2 years. At all, 
there are only 4 insider presidents who seem more responsible for bankruptcy but turn 
out to remain after rehabilitation. This result strongly suggests that, whatever legal 
procedures a bankrupt firm chooses, the president is less likely to remain and not to take 
the responsibility of poor performance, which causes bankruptcy.   
   
Insert <Table 5> here 
 
    On the other hand, this finding also suggests that Civil Rehabilitation Law 
probably reduces the personal burdens for incumbent managers. Under Corporate 
Reorganization, all incumbent directors and officers have to incur heavy personal costs 
because all of them should depart. After Rehabilitation filings, however, at least thirteen 
presidents continue to take office. This turnover rate is higher than that in other 
countries, but it is much lower than 100% turnover rate under Corporate Reorganization   18
law
7. The rush of rehabilitation filings of large firms soon after the passage of law 
supports this viewpoint. There is only three-year history of DIP bankruptcy practice; 
more evidence in the future is needed to examine what roles of DIP plays. 
 
5.  Priority  Violation 
 
Deviations from absolute priority can be regarded as indirect costs of formal 
reorganization. Jensen (1989) argues that deviations of priority arising from provisions 
of formal reorganization process in U.S. violate debt contracts. In this section, I identify 
24 Rehabilitation plans, and 22 Reorganization plans that are confirmed. Table 6, 7 
summarize violation of priority for the firms examined. Participants in a reorganization 
bankruptcy approve a reorganization plan, leaving room for negotiations among the 
various classes of claimholders and for violation of priority of claims. Priority of claims 
can be violated for both secured creditors and unsecured creditors. Priority of secured 
claims is violated in 14% (3/22) of the cases. But the percentage of claims paid to 
secured creditors is still as high as 90% in each case. Shareholders received nothing and 
thus priority for unsecured creditors holds in all cases of Reorganization. Under 
Rehabilitation Law, secured creditors may exercise their rights outside the 
Rehabilitation proceedings. The Rehabilitation debtor may, however, in a case where 
collateral properties are indispensable for continuation of business of the debtor, make 
an application to the court for an approval of extinguishing all the security right on the 
properties, by paying money equivalent to the market value of the properties to the court. 
I do not find any cases of extinguishing security right in practice. Thus we can take a 
                                                       
7  Professor Soogeun Oh points out that high turnover rate of presidents might the 
evidence that DIP is not the incentive in Japan as much as other countries.     19
view of no violation of priority for secured claims in Rehabilitation. However, priority 
of claims for unsecured creditors is violated for 17% (4/24) of the cases in 
Rehabilitation. 
 
Insert <Table 6,7 > here 
 
At all, the priority of claims for secured creditors is less likely to be violated in 
Japan. It only counts for 6% (3/46). As well in US, priority is less likely to be violated 
for secured firms. Virtually, priority of claims for the secured creditors is maintained in 
92% (34/37) in the resolution for 37 exchange-listed firms filing for bankruptcy 
between 1980 and 1986 reported in Weiss (1990). On the other hand, however, the 
priority violation for unsecured creditors is more likely to occur in US than in Japan. 
The percentage of violation of priority of claims for unsecured creditors is as high as 
70% (26/37). In sum, strict priority of claims in 39 cases (85%) held among a sample of 
46 publicly traded firms that filed for Corporate Reorganization or Civil Rehabilitation, 
comparing with 8 (22%) cases of maintenance of priority among the 37 cases in Weiss 
(1990).  
It is not surprising that priority of claims is less violated for secured creditors, since 
secured creditors are protected well even there is automatic stay under Reorganization 
Law, and secured creditors are outside the procedure under Rehabilitation Law. One 
reason for high percentage of maintenance of priority of claims for unsecured creditors 
probably is that typically financial institutions such as bank lenders; insurance company 
lenders hold proportional equity of a borrowing firm. This mitigates the conflict 
between shareholders and unsecured creditors. Next, in practice shareholders virtually 
do not have the right of vote, because most Reorganization companies fail to fully pay   20
claims of unsecured creditors. Most importantly, the bargaining power of shareholders 
is much weaker in Reorganization where court-appointed trustees control reorganization 
than that in the debtor-in-possession reorganization workout process, in particular for 
owner or family controlled firms. Consequently, there are no priority violations of 
claims for unsecured creditors in Reorganization.   
Deviations in favor of equity holders seem more likely to occur in Rehabilitation, 
since the incumbent management is potentially allowed to remain. However, unsecured 
creditors can vote against a rehabilitation plan in which priority is violated for 
unsecured creditors. Notice that only unsecured creditors are exclusively entitled the 
right of vote. Consistently there are only 4 (17%) cases of priority violation for 
unsecured creditors in the 24 cases of Rehabilitation. The percentage of priority 
violation for unsecured creditors in Rehabilitation is higher than that in Reorganization, 
but still much lower than that in US bankruptcy resolution.   
 
6.  The Duration in Bankruptcy   
 
In the remaining part of this paper, I address the following questions empirically: 
How are firm characteristics related to the speed of bankruptcy resolution in Japan? 
Does the bankruptcy reform in Japan facilitate a faster conclusion of bankruptcy? What 
incentives does Civil Rehabilitation Law provide to distressed firms? To the best of our 
knowledge, mine is the first empirical study on these issues. The length of the 
bankruptcy legal process is important because it can affect the eventual outcome as well 
as the value of firm’s assets. Some indirect bankruptcy costs, such as lost sales, lost 
investment opportunities may rise with time in bankruptcy, as suggested in Giammarino 
(1989), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Mooradian (1994) and Roe (1987). In detail,   21
bargaining and coordination problems may delay both Reorganization and 
Rehabilitation processes. Empirical studies of Helwege (1999), Li (1999) and Orbe et al 
(2001) show that firm size the duration in bankruptcy for U.S. firms. Recently, Dahiya 
et al (2003) find that DIP financed bankrupt firms are quicker to emerge and also 
quicker to liquidate.   
 
Insert <Table 8> here 
 
Individual duration data for 25 Reorganization firms and 27 Rehabilitation firms is 
shown in Figure 1. In this dataset, only one Corporate Reorganization observation is 
censored; that is, when this study has finished the firm still stays in Corporate 
Reorganization. As shown, the shortest stay in Corporate Reorganization is 0.84 years. 
And the latest Corporate Reorganization firm takes 3.5 years to exit. For Civil 
Rehabilitation, the shortest stay is 0.35 years and the longest duration is 0.91 years. Out 
of 27 Civil Rehabilitation firms, 26 firms exit from bankruptcy faster than the fastest 
Corporate Reorganization firm. As Table 8 shows, the average time from filing of the 
bankruptcy petition under Corporate Reorganization Law to resolution of the sample of 
24 firms is 1.9 years. And on average it takes 0.6 years for 27 firms to reach resolution 
from Civil Rehabilitation petition filing. It is 1.3 years shorter than that of Corporate 
Reorganization Law. The fact suggests that the passage of Civil Rehabilitation Law 
facilitates a faster exit from bankruptcy. So the main purpose of Civil Rehabilitation 
Law is achieved.   
Also, the bankruptcy legal reform has a strong impact on duration under Corporate 
Reorganization. From 1997 to 1999, Table 8 shows that on average 16 firms take 2.2 
years to reach resolution. But the mean Reorganization duration is 1.2 years.   22
Reorganization firms to exit from bankruptcy 1 year faster post 2000 bankruptcy reform. 
It is the same for median durations. Figure 3 indicates individual Corporate 
Reorganization duration data before and after the bankruptcy reform. The shortest stay 
time in Corporate Reorganization is 1.18 years and the latest time is 3.54 years in the 
period 1997 – 1999. Post the bankruptcy reform, the shortest and latest are 0.84 and 
2.04 respectively.   
 
Insert <Figure1, 2, 3> here 
 
The recent bankruptcy reform in Japan is highly influenced by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, in particular, Chapter 11. The bankruptcy duration in U.S. also provides an 
important benchmark to evaluate the bankruptcy duration in Japan. Franks and Torouts 
(1989) report an average of 4.5 years for 16 firms filing before the revision of the U.S. 
bankruptcy Code in 1979, and 2.7 years for 14 firms filing afterward. Similarly, Weiss 
(1990) reports that on average a firm spends 2.5 years in bankruptcy for 37 New York 
and American Stock Exchange firms filing for bankruptcy in a large downturn of 
American economy between November 1979 and December 1986. The average time 
from the filing of the bankruptcy petition to the resolution in Japan is 1.2 years, taking 
Corporate Reorganization and Civil Rehabilitation as a whole. It is about 1.3 years less 
than the U.S. average bankruptcy duration. After the 2000 bankruptcy reform, it is even 
faster. The result is summarized at Table 9. Limited to bankruptcy duration, Japan has a 
quite effective legal system.   
 
Insert Table 9 here 
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To analyze how firm characteristics are related to the speed of bankruptcy 
resolution in Japan, a log-logistic survival model is employed. That is, the period from a 
firm filing for reorganization or rehabilitation, until the approval of a plan by the court. 
Conditional on the firm characteristics x = [x1,…,xK]’, the probability that the length of 
time spent in bankruptcy T ≥ t is S (t, x) = 1/(1+exp (P (log (t) - β’x)), where β = [β1, …, 
βK]’. Likelihood function is Π i[Pf(P (log (t) - β’xi))
δ(i)[S(P (log (t) - β’ xi)) 
δ(i), where 
δ(i) is right censoring indicator. A positive (negative) βk implies that xk has a positive 
(negative) effect on the duration in bankruptcy.   
 
Insert <Table 10>here 
 
Table 10 reports data descriptions of firm characteristics for firms filing for 
reorganization, rehabilitation respectively, at the last fiscal year end prior to the 
bankruptcy filing. In all cases, the accounting data are for the last fiscal year before the 
bankruptcy filing. The variables are: 
LOGASSET—the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the 
last fiscal year before the bankruptcy filing 
LEVERAGE — the ratio of the total liability to the total assets   
PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY— the fraction of public bonds outstanding in the 
total liability 
POST2000— a dummy variable that takes the value one if the Reorganization 
filing took place after 1999, otherwise 0 
COLLATERAL/ASSET — the ration of the value of assets used as collateral to the 
total assets 
My first concern is whether the bankruptcy legal system provides an incentive for   24
financially troubled firms to file for bankruptcy soon. As shown in Table 10, bankrupt 
firms are typically high leveraged. This implies that the managers of a financially 
distressed firm have a strong incentive to hope for a miraculous reverse of fortune rather 
than to file for bankruptcy soon. The more loss a bankrupt firm has suffered, the higher 
is the leverage. Consequentially, LEVERAGE can be a good proxy for how late a firm 
files for bankruptcy. As Baird (2001) points out, a firm in desperate straits does not bode 
well for the bargaining process in bankruptcy. Therefore, higher leveraged firms could 
take more time to exit from bankruptcy. I expect a positive coefficient for LEVERAGE. 
I use PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY as a proxy for severity of holdout problem. 
Usually, consent from a diffuse set of bondholders is extremely difficult to obtain. 
Bondholders’ atomistic actions may holdout and prolong the bankruptcy process. A firm 
with a high fraction of public bonds outstanding in the total liability is more likely to 
stay longer in bankruptcy. I therefore expect to find a positive coefficient for PUBLIC 
BONDS/LIABILITY. For U.S. firms, the findings of James (1995, 1996) suggest that the 
debt structure significantly affects the firm’s ability to restructure its debt privately.  By 
contrast, Helwege (1999) finds that bondholder holdouts are not a significant problem, 
as firms with proportionately more bonds have shorter default spells.   
The impact of asset size on bankruptcy duration is measured by LOGASSET. Asset 
size can be a proxy for difficulties of bargaining and coordination among creditors. I 
expect a positive coefficient for the LOGASSET. Previous studies of Helwege (1999), Li 
(1999), Orbe et al (2001) and Dahiya et al (2003) all show that larger firms tend to stay 
longer in Chapter 11 in US. COLLATERAL/ASEET is used as a proxy to capture the 
difference that secured creditors may exercise their rights without following the 
Corporate Rehabilitation proceedings while secured creditors must follow the Corporate 
Reorganization proceedings. I also control for the bankruptcy legal reform by including   25
the dummy variable POST2000 for Corporate Reorganization duration.   
 
Insert <Table 12, 13> here 
 
Table 12, 13 give the log-logistic estimates for duration in Corporate 
Reorganization, Civil Rehabilitation respectively. Comparing Table 12 and Table 13, we 
can see that results are quite different. First, I find that LEVERAGE has no significant 
effect on duration in Corporate Reorganization. This suggests that before the bankruptcy 
legal reform in 2000 financially distressed firms seem have no incentives to file for 
Corporate Reorganization earlier, because they would lose anything regardless of the 
speed of the bankruptcy legal process. In comparison, high leveraged Civil 
Rehabilitation firms are less likely to quickly emerge from the process. In addition, 
Civil Rehabilitation is a Debtor-in-possession procedure. If more and more managers of 
firms in economic difficulties realize that it is more likely to quickly emerge from Civil 
Rehabilitation to file for Rehabilitation soon, Civil Rehabilitation Law may provide an 
incentive for firms in economic difficulties to file for Civil Rehabilitation earlier. More 
future practice is in need to test this hypothesis. Also, it is important to examine whether 
the debtor’s managers are more likely to remain if they file for Rehabilitation soon. 
Another difference is that FRACTION PUBLIC BONDS prolongs Corporate 
Reorganization duration while it does not for Civil Rehabilitation. Because only a small 
fraction of Corporate Reorganization firms have public bonds outstanding and thus the 
holdout problem of bondholders is a minor reason
8. Interestingly, LOSASSET is not 
significant in any estimates for duration in either Corporate Reorganization or Civil 
                                                       
8  Detailed discussions of Professor Soogeun OH and Professor Sung-In Jun are 
gratefully acknowledged.     26
Rehabilitation. The results are similar when log of total liability is included instead. In 
contrast, Helwege (1999), Li (1999), Orbe et al (2001), Dahiya et al (2003) all show that 
larger firms tend to stay longer in Chapter 11 in US. This study provides important 
evidence for international comparative law study. One explanation is that virtually 
shareholders are not entitled the right of vote in case where the company fails to fully 
satisfy its debt obligations with its properties both under Corporate Reorganization Law 
and Civil Rehabilitation Law. Therefore, the Japanese bankruptcy legal procedure is 
simpler than the U.S. procedure. Also I find that COLLATERAL/ASSET has a positive 
sign for Rehabilitation duration but a negative sign for Corporate Reorganization 
duration. But none of them is significant. 
In summary, a Civil Rehabilitation firm spends in bankruptcy substantially shorter 
than a Corporate Reorganization firm. Also, a Corporate Reorganization firms emerges 
quicker after the 2000 bankruptcy reform. Internationally, a bankrupt firm exits faster 
than a U.S. firm filing for Chapter 11, which has strong influences on the bankruptcy 
reform in Japan. Moreover, a higher leveraged Civil Rehabilitation firms stay longer 
than does a lower leveraged one. It is not the case for Corporate Reorganization. Despite 
short Civil Rehabilitation duration, the practice during the first three years after the 
passage of Civil Rehabilitation law provides no hard evidence in support that financially 
distressed firms file for bankruptcy earlier than before. Rather, Civil Rehabilitation 
firms have higher leverage ratios than Corporate Reorganization firms. Also, recovery 
rates for unsecured creditors are as low as before. However, these are partially due to 
that many firms were waiting for the passage of Civil Rehabilitation law rather than 
filing for Corporate Reorganization. This is emerging an important theme in the future.   
 
7.   Conclusion   27
 
    As the 1990s’ recession of in Japan persisting, however, recently quite a few 
publicly traded Japanese firms file for bankruptcy. A big difference between old 
Japanese Corporate Reorganization Law practice and US Chapter 11 is that, not the 
debtor’s management, but a court-appointed receiver operates the firm and works out a 
reorganization plan. And in principle incumbent managers depart the firm, once 
Corporate Reorganization proceeding commences. In other words, incumbent managers 
experience large personal costs under Corporate Reorganization Law. This aspect is 
rather similar to Chapter 7 of the Code as well as Liquidation Law of Japan. Since 
managers are displaced and in almost all cases equity becomes worthless, managers 
have strong incentives to resist filing for Liquidation or Reorganization as long as 
possible. This means both Liquidation and Reorganization can be inefficient procedures 
in terms of ex ante bankruptcy costs. 
    As a response to this issue, Civil Rehabilitation Law is passed and it takes effect 
after April 1 2000. The passage of Civil Rehabilitation Law has been substantially 
revising bankruptcy administration in Japan. One aspect is equivalent to Chapter 11 of 
the Code as following: the debtor’ management operates the firm and works out a 
Rehabilitation plan, unless an interested party can prove management is incompetent. In 
order to facilitate speedy conclusions of the bankruptcy legal process, this debtor in 
possession aspect of Civil Rehabilitation Law aims to provide incentives for managers 
of failing firms to file for Civil Rehabilitation not too late by reducing their personal 
burdens.  
This study seeks to evaluate the 2000 bankruptcy reform in Japan. I investigates 
the intervention of bank lenders prior to bankruptcy filings, president turnover around 
bankruptcy, the indirect costs of bankruptcy such as priority violation in bankruptcy   28
resolution as well as duration in bankruptcy, by focusing on the differences under 
Corporate Reorganization Law: a trustee control procedure vs. Civil Rehabilitation 
Law: a debtor in possession bankruptcy procedure, which takes effect after April 2000.   
    In summary, recently Japanese main banks are jettisoning quite a few of their 
troubled borrowers and are less likely to intervene they did before. And most bankrupt 
firms experience abnormal president turnover around bankruptcy filings, regardless 
types of filings. Priority of claims is less violated in bankruptcy resolution than that in 
the United States. Civil Rehabilitation firm spends in bankruptcy substantially shorter 
than a Corporate Reorganization firm. Also, a Corporate Reorganization firms emerges 
quicker after the 2000 bankruptcy reform. Internationally, a bankrupt firm exits faster 
than a U.S. firm filing for Chapter 11, which has strong influences on the bankruptcy 
reform in Japan. Most importantly, Civil Rehabilitation Law may provide an incentive 
to firms in economic difficulties to file for bankruptcy not too late, although future 
evidence is in need. I believe our study complements previous studies that investigate 
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<Table 1> Time Series of Filings for Bankruptcy under Corporate Reorganization Law, 
Civil Rehabilitation Law and Liquidation Law of Japan in Jan/1987-Aug/2002 
 
Year 
Number of Corporate 
Reorganization filing 






6 10  - 
0 10 
‘97 6  -  0  6 
‘98 4  -  3  7 
‘99 2  -  0  3 
‘00 3  7  1 11 
‘01 3  12  1 15 
‘02* 8  11  5  24 
*Jan/2002 – Aug/2002 
Banks, security companies, housing loan companies and insurance companies are 
excluded   33
<Table 2> Main Differences between Corporate Reorganization Law and Civil 
Rehabilitation Law 
 
Corporate Reorganization  Civil Rehabilitation 
The firm continues as a going 
concern 
The firm continues as a going concern 
A court-appointed receiver in 
reorganization take the control, 
while the debtor management 
departs the firm 
The debtor management continues to take the 
control (debtor in possession), unless the debtor 
management is incompetent, for instance, 
management frauds. And the court may appoint 
receivers in case of the incompetence of the 
debtor management based on an application of an 
interest party 
 
The court may order stay to protect 
the firm from creditor harassment 
after the filing , if it is in need. And 
stay effects upon the ruling of 
commencement of Corporate 
Reorganization.  
 
The court may order a stay to protect the firm 
from creditor harassment, for the time until the 
ruling is given. Also the court may order a 
discontinuance of exercise of a security right 
existing on properties. And in a case where 
collateral are indispensable for continuation of 
business, the rehabilitation debtor may make an 
application to the court for an approval of 
extinguishing all the security rights on the 
properties, by paying money equivalent to the 
market value 
A reorganization plan should be   
approved by secured creditors,   
unsecured creditors and 
shareholders. But shareholders 
cannot have the right of vote in case 
where the company fails to fully 
satisfy its obligations with its 
properties.  
Unsecured creditors approve a rehabilitation plan. 
Generally, secured creditors may exercise their 
rights without following the rehabilitation 
proceedings. And capital may be reduced without 
shareholders’ approval in case where the 
rehabilitation company fails to fully satisfy its 
obligations with its properties.   34
  <Table 3> Involvement of Bank Lenders 
 
Number of firms intervened by bank lenders 
Required principal payments on loans are reduced  5 
Required interest payments on loans are reduced  5 
Bank lenders dispatch managers  10 
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<Table 4> Intended Positions/Occupations Reported in Nikkei of Replaced 
Presidents, Who Did Not Remain Chairmen and Representative Directors. Management 
Changes Tracked for Four Years, Starting Four Years Before the Year of Bankruptcy 
filing. 
 
   Panel A: Corporation Reorganization filings 
 
Number of managers holding specified positions/occupations
Chairman 3 
Vice president  2 
Advisory with directorship    2 
Part-time director  1 
Consultant   5 
No information  3 
Panel B: Civil Rehabilitation filings 
Number of managers holding specified positions/occupations
Director and Chairman  3 
Advisor with directorship    1 
Director but no other titles  5 
Consultant   3 
Managing director of other group firm  2 
No information  15 
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<Table 5> The Careers of Presidents Who Remain after Rehabilitation 
 
  President career less than 2 years  President career more than 2 years 
Outsider 1  3 
Insider 5  4 
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<Table 6> Summary of Claims Resolution for 22 Public Traded Firms Filing 
Bankruptcy under Corporate Reorganization Law in January 1997 - August 2002 
 
Percentage or description of claim paid
Firm name  Secured creditors  Unsecured creditors  Shareholders
Priority violated for secured creditors only 
YAOHAN JAPAN  90%  3%  0 
DAI-ICHI HOTEL  90%  4%  0 
SASAKI GLASS  90％-100% 3% - 8%  0 
Priority held 
KYOTARU 100%  20%  0 
TOKAI KOGYO  100%  8%-2%  0 
TADA 100%  13%  0 
DAITO KOGYO  100%  8%  0 
TOSHOKU 100%  8%  0 
MITSUI WHARF  100%  36.9%－100％ 0 
ASAKAWAGUMI 100%  5%-10%  0 
LONGCHAMP 100%  9%  0 
JDC 100%  9%-10%  0 
NIKKO ELECTRIC 
INDUSTRY 
100% 10%  0 
KOKOKU STEEL WIRE  100%  6.50%  0 
NAGASAKIYA 100%  0.50%  0 
LIFE 100%  47.72%-  0 
JAPAN METALS & 
CHEMICALS 
100%  ？ 0 
SATO KOGYO  100%  4%  0 
NISSAN CONSTRUCTION  100%  7% - 100％、 0 
KEISHIN WAREHOUSE  100%  8%  0 
HOKO FISHING  100%  23% -100%  0 
HOKUBU 100%  25%  0   38
<Table 7> Summary of Claims Resolution for 24 Public Traded Firms Filing 
Bankruptcy under Civil Rehabilitation Law in April 2000 - August 2002 
 
Percentage or description of claim paid 
Firm name  Unsecured creditors  Shareholders 
Priority held 
TOYO STEEL  NA  0 
AKAI NA  0 
SOGO 5%  0 
FUJII 50%  0 
MARUTOMI GROUP  15%  0 
FUJI CAR MFG.  8%- 10%  0 
IKEGAI 1.59%  0 
FOOTWORK INTERNATIONAL NA  0 
BETTER LIFE  10%  0 
OHKURA ELECTRIC  1.50%  0 
ERGOTECH NA  0 
AOKI 2%  0 
KOTOBUKIYA 0.70%  0 
SHOKUSAN JUTAKU SOGO  NA  0 
KITANOKAZOKU 6%  0 
SOGO DENKI  NA  0 
NAKAMICHI NA  0 
IZUMI INDUSTRIES  NA  0 
ISEKI POLY-TECH  NA  0 
DAI NIPPON CONSTRUCTION  2％ 0 
Priority violated for unsecured creditors only 
NICHIBOSHIN 4.14%  1% 
KAWADEN 22.43%  21% 
HAKUSUI TECH  NA  10% 
FUJIKI KOMUTEN  5% - 100％ 100％ 
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<Table 8> Descriptive Statistics for Bankruptcy Durations 
. 
 DURATION  Mean  Std.Dev.  Median  Minimum Maximum Cases
 Bankruptcy  1997-2002  1.17974 0.825093 0.83833 0.350833  3.54 51 
 Bankruptcy  ‘97-‘99  2.19917 0.628218 2.17 1.18333  3.54 16 
 Bankruptcy  ’00-‘02  0.713714 0.338252 0.57833 0.350833  2.04083 35 
 Reorganization  ‘97-‘99  2.19917 0.628218 2.17 1.18333  3.54 16 
 Reorganization  ‘00-‘02  1.19479 0.369926 1.1287 0.838333  2.04083 8 
 Reorganization  ’97-‘02  1.86437 0.730035 1.8462 0.838333  3.54 24 
  Rehabilitation    0.571173 0.143058 0.54833 0.350833  0.9125 27 
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<Table 9>    Mean Time From Bankruptcy Petition to Resolution: US vesus Japan   
 
JAPAN (current paper) 
  Corporate Reorganization  2.2 years  24 firms 
  Civil Rehabilitation  .57 years  27 firms 
  Whole    1.2 years  51 firms 
  Before 2000  2.2  16 firms 
 Afterward  .71  35  firms 
U.S.A. (Franks and Torouts (1989))     
  Before 1979  4.5 years  16 firms 
  Afterward  2.7 years  14 firms 
U.S.A. (Weiss (1990)) 
  After 1979  2.5 years  37 firms 
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<Table 10> Descriptive Statistics for 25 Publicly Traded Firms Filing for Corporate 
Reorganization in 1997- August 2002 and 27 Publicly Traded Firms Filing Civil 
Rehabilitation in April 2000 - August 2002. 
 
LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the 
last fiscal year before the bankruptcy filing. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total liability 
to the total assets. PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY is the fraction of public bonds 
outstanding in the total liability. COLLATERAL/ASSET is the ration of the value of 
assets used as collateral to the total assets. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Reorganization  firms     
 Mean  Med.  Std.Dev.  Cases 
ASSET (millions of yen)  204.60 114.90  309.08 25 
PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY   0.0370377 0 0.08173  25 
LEVERAGE 0.891696 0.924708 0.112048  25 
COLLATERAL/ASSET   0.310112 0.274631 0.221833  25 
 Rehabilitation  firms     
 Mean  Med.  Std.Dev.  Cases 
ASSET (millions of yen)  54.54 22.71 90.47  27 
PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY   0.0124753 0 0.027838  27 
LEVERAGE 1.29515 0.933156 1.08802  27 
COLLATERAL/ASSET   0.315463 0.28956 0.178389  27 
   42
<Table 11> A Log-logistic Duration Model Estimates for Corporate Reorganization  
(Observations = 25, Sample Period = January 1997 - August 2002) 
 
LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the 
last fiscal year before the bankruptcy filing. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total liability 
to the total assets. PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY is the fraction of public bonds 
outstanding in the total liability. POST2000 is dummy variable that takes the value one 
if the Reorganization filing took place after 1999, otherwise 0. COLLATERAL/ASSET is 
the ration of the value of assets used as collateral to the total assets. T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. 
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  Log  likelihood    -1.561122    -1.000966    -1.343801    -1.143118 
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<Table 12> A Log-logistic Duration Model Estimates for Civil Rehabilitation 
(Observations = 27, Sample Period = April 2000 - August 2002) 
 
LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the 
last fiscal year before the bankruptcy filing. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total liability 
to the total assets. PUBLIC BONDS/LIABILITY is the fraction of public bonds 
outstanding in the total liability. COLLATERAL/ASSET is the ration of the value of 
assets used as collateral to the total assets. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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  Log  likelihood  4.854069 4.965625 4.854102 
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